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Delhi High Court disapproves defamatory remarks in termination letters
Navin Kumar writes — a profound note on doctrine of compelled self-publication in the light of judgment delivered by Hon'ble Delhi High Court in “Abhijit Mishra Vs. Wipro Limited” dated July 14, 2025 assessing it's implications in today's corporate world. Words are not merely sentences; they are legal acts. A single statement can implicate you in a crime, bind you to a contract, or make you liable to answer in a court of law. In the courtroom, every word can become evidence against you.
You cannot unring a bell. This idea marks the guiding principle of the tort of defamation-a word spoken in public is past recalling. Recently, in Abhijit Mishra vs. Wipro Limited, the Delhi High Court noted that under the doctrine of compelled self-publication, when the plaintiff has no meaningful choice but to disclose the defamatory rationale to prospective employers, the chain of causation remains unbroken. The employer cannot shield itself under the guise of absence of publication. The employer ought to have foreseen the possibility of such confidential communication being shared by the employee with any third person under self-compulsion in search of subsequent employment.
The Delhi High Court directed Wipro to pay a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- to redress the reputational harm, emotional hardship, and loss of professional credibility suffered by the plaintiff owing to the defamatory remarks contained in the termination letter. The Court found the language of the original termination letter to be malicious, causing harm to the plaintiff’s future career prospects, and therefore directed Wipro to remove those remarks. Wipro was further directed by the Court to issue a fresh termination letter devoid of any defamatory content.
The plaintiff was employed in the service of the defendant, i.e., Wipro Limited, as a Principal Consultant from 14.03.2018 until 05.06.2020. The employment was governed by an employment contract. Clause 10 of the said contract provided that the employment could be terminated by either party without assigning any reason. The only condition attached to the repudiation of the contract was that either party had to serve a notice period of one month during the probationary period and two months after confirmation.
A termination letter was issued by the defendant on 05.06.2020. The reasons assigned in the letter for the termination of the plaintiff were his malicious conduct, which had resulted in an irreparable breakdown in the employer-employee relationship. The plaintiff alleged that words like “malicious conduct” and “complete loss of trust” were both defamatory and vexatious. Therefore, the plaintiff instituted a suit seeking issuance of a fresh termination letter expunging the observations impugning the plaintiff’s character and professional integrity. On the other hand, the defendant justified its stance in its written statement, stating that the remarks reflected the plaintiff’s conduct during the tenure of his employment and were necessitated by the circumstances culminating in his termination.
From the language of Clause 10 of the employment contract, it is clear that the contract is determinable in nature. Section 14(d) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 specifies agreements that are “in their nature determinable.” A determinable contract confers unfettered rights upon either party to terminate the contractual arrangement unilaterally, whether at will or upon service of notice, without the presence or requirement of any breach or default.
The Court, after surveying a plethora of judgments, stated that in determinable employment contracts, the relief of specific performance or reinstatement against the will of the employer is not available. The Court observed that “a private employment relationship, being non-statutory and devoid of any public duty overlay, is governed exclusively by the terms mutually negotiated by the individual contracting parties.”
The Court observed that in a determinable contract that has been accepted by both the parties by their own free will, the remedy available to the plaintiff is in the form of liquidated damages. Such compensation must be equated with the salary corresponding to the notice period, which in this case had been duly remitted by the defendant.
The plaintiff's allegations of reputational damage, owing to the usage of words like “malicious conduct” and “complete loss of trust” in the termination letter, were examined by the Court under the head of civil defamation. Civil defamation refers to a tortious wrong where a false statement is made with the intention to diminish the reputation of a person in front of right-minded people of society.
In order to constitute the tort of civil defamation, the first essential is the existence of a defamatory statement. It is not sufficient that words are unkind or harsh, but they must carry a false and defamatory imputation when viewed through the lens of a reasonable person. The second essential is publication. Communication of the defamatory content to at least one person other than the defamed is necessary. The third essential is identifiability. The defamatory statement must refer to a person or a reasonable person must associate such a statement with the plaintiff concerned. The fourth essential element of civil defamation is the absence of a valid legal defence at the time of publication.
The allegations of the plaintiff were examined in light of these essential elements of civil defamation. The remarks in the plaintiff’s termination letter were not substantiated by any document during his employment. To the contrary, in the documents produced by the plaintiff, the Court found references to “Highly valued contribution,” “Good work overall,” and “Abhijit has done well overall this quarter,” with no reference whatsoever to misconduct or breach of trust.
The Court found the statements in the termination letter to be false. The defendant could not produce any documentary evidence such as a warning letter being issued or any disciplinary proceeding initiated against the plaintiff. The plaintiff was successful in proving a clear mismatch between what was alleged in the termination letter and what was stated in a series of contemporaneous performance evaluation records. Moreover, no valid defence was established by the defendant, as the truth of the statements had not been proven and the statements were not justified or made in good faith with due care.
The indispensable criterion of publication in order to constitute civil defamation was examined at length by the Court. The Court observed that over the years, most importantly in American jurisprudence, the concept of self-publication has originated. Originating from the foreseeability principle, the doctrine of self-publication holds that any originator whose conduct predictably forces another to disclose defamatory matter must answer for its spread.
The Court observed that in situations where an employee has to communicate about his termination letter to any third party, especially in the search for subsequent employment, an employer cannot exonerate itself from liability which is foreseeable in nature. The employee in many cases is compelled to produce such communications,i.e., the termination letter, especially in organizations that require background checks. In such situations, the plaintiff would have no alternative but to produce the impugned termination letter containing defamatory remarks. The Court, while making the above observations, noted that the plea raised by the defendant regarding the absence of publication is unsustainable. The foreseeable circulation of the impugned termination letter satisfies the second essential of civil defamation, i.e., the requirement of publication.
The Court observed that Clause 10 of the employment contract gave the right to the employer to terminate employment. However, the impugned termination letter surpasses that framework, and the language of said letter—filled with stigma and insinuations—would accompany the plaintiff into future professional settings. The Court ruled in favour of the plaintiff, stating that the impugned termination letter, replete with stigmatic language and bereft of any foundation, constitutes actionable defamation. In the view of the Court, justice would prevail only when the impugned termination letter would cease to be of any value and a fresh termination letter expunging defamatory remarks would be issued to the plaintiff. The case does not fall in the category of exemplary damages, and the Court directed Wipro to pay a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- as general compensatory damages to redress the reputational harm and emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff due to the defendant’s conduct.
The decision of the Court emphasizes the intrinsic right to reputation, which is embedded under Article 21 of the Constitution. The judgment of the Court has protected the dignity of the professional class against big corporate giants, ensuring fair protection according to the principle of the rule of law.
Navin Kumar